COMPROMISING CONVENTIONAL EDGE FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY

 

The great scholar/teacher and diplomat-par-excellence Kautilya said, “The instruments of war have to be separated and kept apart from the institutions of peace”.

1       . Pakistan since was unable  to achieve its  political aim of annexing Kashmir through   conventional war  devised  strategy of step by step indoctrination of  Kashmiri youth to bleed Kashmir and India by giving thousand cuts and  bleeding India through asymmetric warfare. It exploited dissatisfaction and perceived feeling of discrimination and injustice on regional and religious basis by forcing  India into fighting  proxy war. Asymmetric warfare has internal and external security dimensions, encompass counter terrorism, counter insurgency, guerrilla  warfare and left wing extremism. Realistically dealing with external component of asymmetric warfare is military domain and internal component police domain with gradual response upgradation depending upon situation. Unfortunately counter insurgency domain is taken over by Army obliterating the thin line between external and internal security threats. By doing so Army  has   sacrificed  its  conventional war preparations and     marginalised  police and CAPFs which though capable of controlling  insurgency have not been allowed the role which is primarily theirs.  A quote by Lt Gen Zameer Uddin Shah PVSM, SM, and VSM (retired) former Deputy Chief of Army Staff amply prove that “The paramilitary forces are adequately trained for this onerous task. The Army should be unburdened for its primary task of protecting India from external aggression”. Why so need thorough analysis?

2     The Seventh schedule of the constitution defines and specifies allocation of powers and functions between Union Government and state Government. As per list 1 entry, one, two and two (A) defence of India, Naval, military and air forces and any other armed forces of the Union, deployment of armed force of the Union in any state in aid of the civil power fall under the control of union government. As per list 2, state list entry, one & two public order and police fall under the domain of state government. The responsibility for maintenance of law and order is of state government.  

3   Constitution imposes responsibility upon state governments for maintenance of law and order in their states. Similarly, constitution also imposes a greater responsibility upon union government for ensuring security of borders of India with neighbouring countries so that state and non-state actors from across the borders do not exploit them for spreading violence and instability inside country by exploiting weaknesses in border guarding. It clearly brings out that external and internal security are two distinct facets but are interlinked.  

4     State governments are duty bound to check violence, ensure maintenance of law and order and ensure peace and tranquillity in the state with police forces held at their disposal. However, since independence, the police forces have professionally not measured as expected in performance of their role and task. They have not been able to maintain routine law and order but to say of terrorism and insurgency. Be it riots, terrorism /insurgency, central forces including army are invariably called to control and contain situation. Political and bureaucratic hierarchy in the Ministry of Home affairs  at the drop of hat on the request of state governments despatch central Armed Police forces (CAPFs) to the states to quell violence and restore peace. The top-heavy state police administration instead of strengthening police and making it a professional machine have into routine habit of calling for central police forces and Army. Centre too happily obliges.

5   Army is deployed routinely in north east for law and order duties thereby affecting its training and preparedness for war.  As reported in “The Print” dated 29 Jan 2020, Army Chief General M.M. Naravane announced plans to withdraw army deployed in counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and internal security in the Northeast in the next 18 to 24 months to focus on “conventional warfare” subject to improvement in ground situation. Similarly, Kashmir is in turmoil since late eighties.  Army is policing Kashmir with CAPFs and J&K police, however, have not been able to contain violence since it has not been able to plug gaps in line of control.  Army in Kashmir performing counter-insurgency duties has become an extension of police and CAPFs. Its continued deployment in Kashmir in the form of Rashtriya Rifles (RR) composed of regular personnel has led to vacancies in combat and service units, affected training, maintenance of equipment and blunted its conventional edge. Its continued deployment in counter-insurgency has ensured sustainability of Pakistan based state and non-state actors as they have successfully tied Army and its leadership in counter insurgency web.

6.    The excessive use of Army for counter insurgency   is in a way political/permanent executive and Army are complementing each other. None has appreciated the implications of complementary policy in long run for national defence. Government thinks   that it being paymaster has discretion to use Army as it pleases. The Army hierarchy has gone with government thinking without realising the implications of ignoring conventional war preparations, which may prove catastrophic with no benefits to the nation but only damage in terms of humiliation, loss of territory and loss of national a pride.

7    There are two schools of thought concerning use of Army for fighting proxy war. One school of thought of government and Army is why to keep a big standing Army idle. Fighting proxy war is also training. The other school of thought of hard-core faujis is that basic job of Army is to fight external aggressors and protect national sovereignty and integrity. To do so it has to modernise, train hard to avoid 1962 and Ladakh 2020 leading to loss of lives and China reclaiming 1959 claim line. Army hierarchy has gone with government thought for use of Army to fight terrorism and proxy war. Same is     to maintain  proximity to  establishment for relevance. Army hierarchy need to realise that to fight conventional war, it has to train and train hard to polish battle drills and battle procedures at section, platoon, company, battalion, brigade and divisional levels as administrative procedures for war. These drills cannot be practised in small team operations during counter insurgency operations. The result of ignoring conventional war preparations will be loss of lives, loss of territory, loss of national pride and esteem. All this calls for immediate pull back of Army from internal security duties and proxy war duties.

 

WHY COUNTER INSURGENCY PRIORTISED OVER CONVENTIONAL WAR

 8.      Pakistan Centric approach   India’s defence and security establishment both civil and military has become too Pakistan centric and obliterated the line which exists between internal and external security. The insurgency, which emanated from Pakistan through line of control have rather given military leadership an albei to stay relevant in internal security scenario. Military leadership has blurred the lines between internal and external security for relevance in the asymmetric warfare. For the purpose, it has committed its large trained strength to fight insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir. Army and governments Pakistan centric approach has diluted   Army preparations for conventional war, procurement of arms, ammunition, equipment, maintenance of equipment and mental orientation of officers and troops becoming counter insurgency centric instead of being conventional war centric.

9.    Portrayal as Saviours- When war takes place is difficult to predict. What shape it takes is also difficult to predict. It may be localised conflict or full-fledged war. Events of Chinese transgressions in Galwan, Pangong Tso, Hot springs and Depsang valley are example of localised silent incursions surprising Indian Army. Kargil war of 1999 is another example of localised conflict. On line of actual control (LAC), localised incursions of China have become a norm.  However, preparations for war has to continue day in and out after assessment of war capability of enemy. Preparations for war is full time job but unfortunately, government and army leadership has taken conventional war preparations as part time job and counter insurgency as full time job.  For relevance, army has taken over the job of police and CAPFs and relegated them to background. It could probably be due to following factors:-

(a)             Media coverage-CI operations form part of national headlines 24X7X365 days both in print and electronic media.

(b)           CI operations give an elated sense of satisfaction, nationalism and recognition.

(c)               Portray Army as saviour of nation by performing the task which otherwise should have been done by police and CAPFs.

(d)               Post retirement relevance.

10.    Threat Assessment -Kashmir has always been at the radar of Pakistan and China despite the fact that its accession in India is final and there is no dispute attached to it however, this finality has not been acceptable to our adversaries hence insurgency. Insurgency especially in Kashmir and down town Srinagar has been very violent and has displaced communities. Border Security Force professionally handled the situation with police support. However, threat assessment projected made government to conclude that situation may be difficult for CAPFs like BSF and CRPF aided by police to handle.  Government of India concurred with assessment and brought military into the vortex of insurgency though its presence has not made much difference on ground.

11.         Achievement Syndrome -   Insurgency is tangible and non-tangible but  achievements related to counter-insurgency    operations are tangible measurable in numbers. The military leadership could not resist the temptation of achievement syndrome, which brings name and fame to leadership, and sense of satisfaction inculcated in troops. However, the leadership prioritised CI over conventional war preparations. The cost of ignoring conventional war preparations is very heavy and nation may repent the dangers of unpreparedness. Another factor is career advancement connected with achievements and figures of success in CI operations, which has psychologically oriented leadership more towards counter insurgency operations ignoring basic domain of war fighting preparations.

 

  IMPLICATIONS OF OVER INDULDGENCE IN COUNTER INSURGENCY

12.       Basic task of Armed forces is to ensure territorial integrity of nation from external aggression. Armed forces can ensure that only if train for the task and build up capabilities in all spheres of warfare better than what adversaries build. Physical fitness , mental robustness ,psychological orientation further help in strengthening the resolve to fight and defeat the enemy aided by better equipment and infrastructure. In the case of Indian Army and defence forces as can be made out from what is available in public domain, there are shortfalls and deficiencies in terms of arms, ammunition and equipment. There are also deficiencies of manpower due to mandatory deputation to Rashtriya Rifles (RR). The deficiencies of equipment and manpower certainly impact training which impacts war preparedness and ultimately affect morale and motivation.

13.      The continuous and consistent role of Army in counter insurgency and internal security grid has led to debatable issue of politicisation, which gets magnified post retirement. The result of continuous interaction with police while in Rashtriya Rifles or otherwise, rank and file is mentally and psychologically disorientated from main task. Bringing back orientation takes time. The acrimonious TV and twitter debates where some of the veterans get involved in use of intemperate, undignified and unparliamentarily language ultimately effects professionalism of soldier as troops identify them with officers through system of regimentation. Army leadership and veterans need to realise this and need to desist from unprofessional TV debates and focus more on professional and relevant content.

   14     The following could be probable implications of Army’s over indulgence in counter insurgency grid:-

(a)    Relegating basic task,  war preparations as second priority.

 (b)   Infiltration through large gaps on line of control due to thin deployment sustaining insurgency.

  (c)   Deficiencies and vacancies in fighting arms and services affect operational and administrative preparations.

 (d)   Training, physical fitness and maintenance of equipment suffers due to extraneous commitments of CI grid.

(e)     Continuous focus and involvement   of     army leadership with police leadership, bureaucracy to fight insurgency de- focusses them from conventional war orientation.

 (f)     Continuous involvement of troops with police develops familiarity not good for discipline and morale.

(h)    Army getting psychologically better oriented towards policing than fighting conventional war.

(j)    Army successfully tied by Pakistan in fighting proxy war thereby compensating numerical inferiority.

(k)     Army leadership not paying attention towards mandated wartime role of CAPFs like BSF and ITBP due to its preoccupation in counter insurgency grid further depleting conventional war edge.

(l)    The most dangerous perceivable fall out is ideological orientation of officers on political lines which though not visible in-service gets magnified post retirement.

(m)  The lure  for   post-retirement jobs affect  performance and affect   troops. 

(n)  Acrimonious   TV debates with veterans fighting each affect serving personnel as also regimentation thus affecting professionalism and discipline.

 

 

HOW TO DISENGAGE ARMY FROM COUNTER INSURGENCY

15.     India has hostile borders inundated with hostile neighbours. Our two principal opponents China and Pakistan individually and combined together pose a major military threat to nation’s territorial integrity which nation can ignore at own peril. Other neighbours are also not positively disposed towards the country.   Hostile neighbours have nibbled and annexed Indian land at will. Not only Pakistan and China, even Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar flex muscle against India of and on at will.  Why so?  They appreciate the weaknesses in our defence capabilities in terms of modernisation and inventory management.  Army more engrossed in internal security duties than preparing for conventional war. First of all nation and Army which is a very professional Army need to accept the fact that conventional war preparations need full time  attention and cannot be ignored at the altar of fighting proxy war.  These shortcomings have bolstered adversaries to violate our borders and territorial integrity.

16.  There is an urgent need to disengage Army from counter insurgency duties all over country to enable it to focus on preparing for conventional war, which is a full time job and cannot be part timed. The following is recommended for gradual and disengagement of Army from Internal security duties.

      (a)    Carry out vulnerability mapping of  states to appreciate  and analyse   internal security needs and do capacity and capability building of CAPFs along with Police so that need is not felt to employ Army for counter insurgency duties.

       (b)   Have trust in CAPFs and their professionalism to take on and tame counter insurgency. When they can be trusted to tame naxalism in central India, why trust missing in Kashmir and Northeast. Seem odd and peculiar.

     (c)    Indian Army need to think inwards, do honest introspection of its training equipment and manpower needs for conventional war. Government need to close Rashtriya Rifles(RR) and revert manpower back to Army to enhance its conventional war capabilities.

  (d)     Political dispensation/Government need to follow procedure of systematic graduated response in deployment of forces to control situation and not deploy Army at drop of hat for temporary gains thus interrupting Army’s war preparations.

   (e)     Make state police forces and intelligence professionally capable to ensure proper law and order.  Make them as first responders to situation.

     (f)  Place State Armed Police forces under CAPF officers for training and capability building for synergy and coordination in fighting terrorism and insurgency situations with CAPFs.

   (f)     Raise additional battalions of CAPFs for border guarding as well as internal security to plug gaps on international borders and to fill the gaps in internal security. It need  be done on urgent basis to make border security and internal security full proof.

  (g)     Employ Army for counter insurgency duties only as last  and not routine resort.

 17.  Current security environment along western, eastern borders and threat of two front war   real, there is an urgent need for Army to concentrate upon conventional war preparations to fight two front war and take call to pull back from counter insurgency   in case it wants to ensure territorial integrity and sanctity of borders effectively. As Lt Gen Zameer Uddin Shah PVSM, SM, VSM (retired) former Deputy Chief of Army Staff says, “It is essential that the armed forces are kept insulated from prolonged exposure to internal disorder. It was for the ultimate good that the Army did not get embroiled in resolving the Naxal insurgency. They should also, at the earliest, be relieved from internal security in Jammu and Kashmir”.  Government need to pull out Army from counter insurgency and hand over the responsibility of fighting counter insurgency to CAPFs and police. Earlier done, better it will be for security of country against external aggressors. Hope government gathers courage to take up the gauntlet and poses faith in the capability of CAPFs and police in national interest.